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Abstract
Traditionally, real experiments testing subjective expected utility theory take
for granted that subjects view the Ellsberg task as a one-person decision prob-
lem. We challenge this view: Instead of seeing the Ellsberg task as a one-person
decision problem, it can be perceived as a two-player game. One player chooses
among the bets. The second player determines the distribution of balls in the
Ellsberg urn. The Nash equilibrium predictions of this game depend on the
payoff of the second player, with the game ranging from a zero-sum one to a
coordination game. Meanwhile, the predictions by ambiguity aversion models
remain unchanged. Both situations are implemented experimentally and yield
different results, in line with the game-theoretic prediction. Additionally, the
standard scenario (without explicit mention of how the distribution is deter-
mined) leads to results similar to the zero-sum game, suggesting that subjects
view the standard Ellsberg experiment as a game against the experimenter.
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1 Introduction
In 1961, Daniel Ellsberg proposed a class of choice problems designed to test the
subjective expected utility (SEU) hypothesis formalized by Savage (1954). Ellsberg
conjectured that subjects might exhibit choices that are incompatible with Savage’s
theory. Later experiments implemented Ellsberg’s idea and largely reported behavior
in line with his predictions. In this paper, we challenge the prevalent interpretation of
the Ellsberg choices observed in real experiments. Under a very natural assumption
about the motivation and utility function of the experimenter, the Ellsberg behavior
is supported by the Nash equilibrium in a game between the subject and the exper-
imenter. We run an experiment testing whether subjects view the Ellsberg task as a
game versus the standard view of a one-person decision problem. The data supports
the interpretation as a game.
The key element of Ellsberg’s thought-experiments is a sealed urn filled with colored
balls. The so-called Ellsberg urn is designed to present ambiguity, a choice situation
where some states of nature do not have an obvious probability assignment. In the
3-color version, the urn is placed in front of subjects who are informed that 30 balls
are of red color and 60 balls are somehow divided between black and yellow balls
without any information on the composition. Based on that information, subjects are
confronted with two choice problems, together called the Ellsberg task. In the first
choice problem, subjects are asked to choose between the bet yielding $1 if the ball
drawn is red and $0 otherwise; and the bet yielding $1 if the ball drawn is black and
$0 otherwise. The second choice is between the bet paying $1 if the drawn ball is
not-black and $0 otherwise; and the bet that paying $1 if the drawn ball is not-red
and $0 otherwise. After choices are made, two independent draws with replacements
are conducted. Subjects are paid according to their choices and the experiment ends.1
When certain “experimental conditions” - as Ellsberg (2001, p.137) in his doctoral
thesis called them - are satisfied, the choices made can be used to verify consistency
1Ellsberg proposed two versions of his thought-experiments: one with 2 colors and 2 urns and one
with 3 colors and 1 urn. The paper focuses on the 3-color version. The theoretical results carry over
to the 2-color experiment, see Appendix 7.
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with Savage’s key axiom, the Sure-Thing Principle. Ellsberg carefully outlined the
hypothetical situation in which his experiments are to take place: “You are not told
by whom, or by what process, or for what purpose the composition of Urn II was
determined (except that it was not determined, or revealed, to the observer who is
offering you gambles). [...] In particular, you might try to imagine circumstances that
would convince you that the person offering you gambles knows no more about the
contents of Urn II, or how they are determined, than you do, so that his
offers convey to you no “information” on those contents” (Ellsberg, 2001, p.131-132,
original emphasis).
Typically, the Ellsberg decision problem is formulated in a formal framework with
a state space representing the outcomes of a random draw from the urn. The objects
of choice (i.e., the bets) are depicted as mappings from states to the monetary payoffs.
Ellsberg showed that betting on red (resp. black) in the first choice and betting
on non-red (resp. non-black) in the second choice can not be rationalized by any
subjective probability distribution. The systematic preference to bet on the known
probability colors (bet-on-K ) has been interpreted as ambiguity aversion. Conversely,
the preference to bet on the unknown probability colors (bet-on-U ) has been labeled
ambiguity loving. Betting otherwise (bet-on-C ) is compatible with probabilistic beliefs
and having a belief that one color, either black or yellow, is more likely. This behavior
has been called ambiguity neutral.
The publication of Ellsberg’s thought-experiments paved the way for experimen-
tal and theoretical literature on decision making in the presence of ambiguity. A
growing number of experimental studies, summarized by Camerer and Weber (1992),
implemented Ellsberg’s choice problems. This experimental data was interpreted as
evidence in favor of ambiguity-sensitive behavior, despite the experiments not adher-
ing to the conditions laid out by Ellsberg.2 In 1961, there was no sound theory that
could accommodate his “paradoxical” behavior. It took close to 30 years until the first
2We are not aware of any study for which the above quotation could be said to be completely
true. It is clearly violated in the standard case, when the urn is directly filled by the experimenters.
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axiomatically founded model explaining Ellsberg’s choices could be established.3
The first prominent approach to ambiguity built on the idea that subjective beliefs
are represented by a set of probability distributions (priors). In their path-breaking
contribution, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989, p.142) suggested the following explanation
of the Ellsbergian behavior: [...] the subject has too little information to form a
prior. Hence (s)he considers a set of priors as possible. Being uncertainty averse,
(s)he takes into account the minimal expected utility (over all priors in the set) while
evaluating a bet. The resulting model, known as Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU),
is an archetype of ambiguity averse preferences. The model has been extended in
many directions leading to the general family of uncertainty averse preferences (UAP)
derived by Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2011) which
includes the multiple player preferences of Hansen and Sargent (2001) as well as the
variational preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006).
To draw conclusions about ambiguity-sensitive behavior from real experiments,
Ellsberg’s experimental conditions need to be satisfied. However, these conditions, and
the formal framework used, translate to two implicit, but questionable, assumptions:
First, it is taken for granted that subjects facing the Ellsberg task act in “isolation”.
That is, subjects act without taking into account the potential incentives - the utility
function - of whoever created the distribution in the Ellsberg urn. The motives of
the person filling the urn are entirely neglected. Second, it is assumed that subjects
evaluate each choice problem separately (i.e., independent from each other). This
kind of “separation-principle” is implied by the fact that subjects may rationalize
their choices by distinct probability distributions; one prior for each choice problem.
Focus for the moment on the first assumption. The question arises whether sub-
jects do indeed view the Ellsberg task as a non-interactive decision problem. This is
far from being obvious (and should be tested).4 In the classic experiments used to
3For comprehensive surveys on the ambiguity literature see Gilboa and Marinacci (2013); Karni,
Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2014); Machina and Siniscalchi (2014).
4Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, and Camerer (2005) conduct a fMRI study to compare neural
activations during decisions that involve risk or ambiguity. They find activity differences in the
amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. In another fMRI
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verify Ellsberg’s predictions, an entity filling the urn always exists in the form of the
experimenter and his or her motivations can be considered by the subjects.5 Modeling
this situation does not require a new model; there exists an extremely powerful con-
cept that is concerned exactly with the question of how to react to the motivations,
the payoffs, of other people: the Nash equilibrium. It will be shown that including
the motives of the urn filler accounts for Ellsberg’s predictions. Moreover, taking into
account the distinct motivations impacts the predictions in a way that can be tested
experimentally.
Based on the 3-color experiment, 3-color Ellsberg game refers to the two-player
game where one player fills the Ellsberg urn with balls (adhering to the fixed and non-
fixed proportions as outlaid by Ellsberg) and the other player chooses the Ellsberg
bets, as described above. Denote by D the player choosing a distribution of balls and
by E the player facing the Ellsberg task. That is, player E’s strategy set consists
of the four possible combinations of bets, while player D’s strategy set consists of
all admissible urn compositions. Player E’s utility function is given by the Ellsberg
bet rewards. Player D’s utility depends on the payoff of the Ellsberg bets as well.
Modeling different motives of player D, it can be positively or negatively correlated
with the payoff of player E, leading to games where E plays with or against D.
It is noteworthy that outside motivations feature also in the ambiguity models.
However, the motivations are inherent in the functional representing the UAP. It is
study Gre`zes, Frith, and Passingham (2004) measure the neural activity when subjects evaluate being
deceived by others (relative to evaluating other’s beliefs). Among other regions, they find activation
in the OFC and the amygdala. This suggests that subjects presented with an ambigious situation
may try to judge the (possibly malevolent) intentions of another person.
5In some experiments the composition of the urn is not determined directly by the experimenter.
Instead, some external random generator is used, e.g. a mechanical device or future stock volatility
(Hey, Lotito, and Maffioletti, 2010; Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, and Wakker, 2011). However, as
long as subjects are paid by the experimenter, subjects may feel that the experimenter, having
chosen the random mechanism, may have superior knowledge about the outcome of the random
mechanism. Kadane (1992) points out that Ellsberg behavior can be explained if subjects suspect
that the experimenter cheats by using procedures and a random mechanism for determining the
payoffs which are different from the ones presented to the subjects.
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the min-operator that implements a negative view of the outside world; a “malevolent
Nature”. That is, Nature is viewed as being able to influence the occurrence of events
to the decision makers’ disadvantage by choosing a probability distribution with the
objective of minimizing his expected utility. For this reason, UAP are sometimes
said to admit “a game against Nature interpretation, where decision makers view
themselves as playing a zero-sum game against (a malevolent) Nature” (see Cerreia-
Vioglio at el. (2011, p. 1299). The decision maker’s strategy is choosing a bet while
Nature’s strategy is choosing a probability distribution. However, this negative view
is a primitive of the model and a feature of the decision maker’s preferences, but not
a variable of the situation. As such, the UAP models can not accommodate changes
in motivation unless the preference parameters are changed.
Consider now to the second assumption. According to the separation-principle, an
uncertainty averse decision maker may use different probabilities when evaluating the
two choice problems of the Ellsberg task. Correspondingly, in the ambiguity models,
subjects are viewed as playing two different “games against a malevolent Nature”;
a separate one referring to each choice in the 3-color Ellsberg problem. This is not
assumed in the Nash equilibrium setup where only one game is played.
While Ellsberg and the UAP models use the possible outcomes of draws from the
urn as the domain of subjective beliefs, the Nash equilibrium considers actions of the
opponent player. As such, player E’s beliefs are defined not over the possible colors of
the drawn ball, but over the content of the urn before the draw. This follows naturally
when an opponent and his strategies are considered. Imagine the thought process
of a subject in the actual experiment as it takes place in a laboratory: choices are
paid; someone pays the subjects money; everyone prefers to pay less to paying more;
changing the contents of the urn can, depending on the subjects choices, result in
paying less. This leads to the realization that the experimenter fills the urn, and can
do so in various ways. Once the strategies of the urn filler are considered, however, the
subject has already taken the step to consider the two Ellsberg choices as a part of one,
bigger, problem: how to obtain the highest payoff as a subject, given the action of the
urn filler. Therefore, the experimental setup pushes subjects to evaluate the problem
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differently from what is assumed in the UAP models: because there is interaction
with a second person, the choices are integrated into one decision problem instead
of treating them as two separate problems. The action of the urn filler becomes the
focus.
Since the payoff of any urn filler is not incorporated into the UAP functional,
changing this payoff does not affect the prediction of the models. On the other hand,
Nash equilibria can change when the payoff of one player is altered. In the experimental
treatments, payoffs of the urn fillers are varied. This creates different Nash predictions.
Note that the information about the urn that decision makers in all treatments receive
is identical. In each case there is the same number of known and unknown balls in the
urn which is physically constructed in the same way. Consequently, the predictions
based on the UAP models remain unchanged across treatments.
To vary the urn fillers’ payoff, in two of our treatments the urn is not filled by
the experimenter, but by one group of subjects. In one treatment (malevolent), these
subjects have monetary incentives which are opposite to those of the second group of
subjects making the Ellsberg decisions. In this treatment, each pair of urn filler and
decision maker face a zero-sum game in terms of payoffs. As is shown in Section 2, the
pure Nash equilibrium of this malevolent 3-color Ellsberg game predicts that decision
makers bet-on-K.6 In a second treatment (benevolent), the monetary incentives of the
urn filler are perfectly aligned with the decision maker: they play a coordination game.
This changes the Nash prediction by introducing two additional coordination equilibria
in pure strategies: one for betting on black and one for betting on yellow.
As the main result, the measured betting behavior of decision makers differs be-
tween malevolent and benevolent, in line with the Nash prediction. About half of the
subjects in the malevolent treatment choose bet-on-K. When facing the benevolent urn
filler, less than a quarter of subjects decides to bet-on-K. Instead, most choose bet-on-
C strategies. These are the coordination Nash equilibria strategies of the benevolent
6Interestingly, the Nash equilibrium strategies of the decision maker depend on the risk attitude
of the urn filler. While playing bet-on-K is a Nash equilibrium strategy under any risk attitude of
the urn filler, one additional Nash equilibrium exists only when the urn filler is risk neutral. In this
equilibrium, the decision maker chooses bet-on-U.
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3-color Ellsberg game: when the payoffs make coordination with the filler of the urn
possible, subjects attempt coordination. When the payoffs of urn filler and decision
maker are opposed, the coordination Nash equilibria disappear and the associated
strategies are observed less often. This suggests that at least a part of subjects con-
sider their task to be an interactive and integrated one, instead of the non-interactive,
separated tasks assumed in the UAP framework. It is important to note that, in
the integrated view of the Ellsberg task, subjects need not violate SEU by choosing
bet-on-K.
A third treatment (standard) is used to relate the findings to the typical implemen-
tation of the Ellsberg urn in experiments. Here, the urn is filled by the experimenter
and all subjects are decision makers. Betting behavior differs significantly between the
standard and the benevolent treatment, but not between the standard and the malev-
olent treatment. That is, the betting behavior of subjects explicitly playing a game
against another subject filling the urn is similar to that of subjects in the standard
Ellsberg experiment.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, the 3-color Ellsberg experiment
is described and analyzed as a game between decision maker and urn filler. Nash
equilibria are derived for the malevolent and benevolent treatment. In Section, 3 the
alternative prediction by uncertainty averse preference models is presented. Section
4 compares the two approaches theoretically. Section 5 describes the experimental
design and results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Ellsberg Task and Nash Behavior.
In this section, the classical 3-color experiment of Ellsberg (1961) is interpreted as
an interactive decision problem. We introduce the notion of a 3-color Ellsberg game
between a subject and an urn filler and examine Nash equilibrium behavior.
The 3-color Ellsberg game consists of two players, indexed by D and E. Both
players’ decisions involve an urn containing 30 balls, 10 of which are known to be red
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(R) and 20 of which are somehow divided between black (B) and yellow (Y ).7 Player
E represents the decision maker (subject) who faces the 3-color Ellsberg task. The
task is to make two choices, each between two bets. The bets are presented in Table
1. Each bet pays off $1 or $0, depending on the color of a random and independent
draw from the urn.
Table 1: Bets in the 3-Color Ellsberg Experiment.
Red Black Y ellow
Choice I
f1 $1 $0 $0
f2 $0 $1 $0
Choice II
f3 $1 $0 $1
f4 $0 $1 $1
The two choices made in the 3-color Ellsberg experiment - taken together - can
be seen as a (pure) strategy for player E. Four possible choice combinations exist.
Therefore, the strategy set of player E is SE = {(f1, f3); (f1, f4); (f2, f3); (f2, f4)}. The
strategy of choosing f1 in problem I and f4 in problem II is labeled bet-on-K, where
K stands for the known probability events R and B ∪ Y . Conversely, the strategy
choosing f2 in problem I and f3 in II is called bet-on-U where U denotes the unknown
probability events B and R∪Y . The choices of (f1, f3) are called bet-on-Y and (f2, f4)
bet-on-B with Y and B denoting the yellow and black colors, respectively. Betting
on one of the two colors - yellow or black - by using either bet-on-Y or bet-on-B, is
summarized as bet-on-C.
The task of player D is to determine the composition of the Ellsberg urn by filling
the urn with black and yellow balls. Altogether, there are twenty-one possible distri-
butions. For n = 0, . . . , 20, denote by bn the number of black balls. If player D decides
for bn black balls, the urn contains 30 red, bn black and 20− bn yellow balls. The set
7For ease of exposition, throughout the paper, the traditional Ellsberg colors, red, black and yellow,
and the terms “urn” and “balls” are used. The actual experiment and instructions used yellow, blue
and green marbles in cotton bags instead.
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of all the possible distributions is denoted by SD = {b0, b1, . . . , b20} and represents the
set of (pure) strategies of player D.
Our approach distinguishes two different types of the 3-color Ellsberg game, de-
pending upon the correlation of payoffs of player D with the payoffs of player E. The
game where player D’s payoffs are perfectly negatively correlated is referred to as
the malevolent game. The game is called benevolent when D’s and E’s payoffs are
perfectly positively correlated.
The malevolent 3-color Ellsberg game is zero-sum in payoffs. That is, whenever
the color on which player E decides to bet matches the color of a randomly drawn
ball, player E wins $1 while player D loses $1. Throughout the analysis, the utility
function over monetary payoffs is assumed to be strictly increasing and normalized
to 0 for the payoff of $0 and 1 for the payoff of $1.8 Since two independent random
draws are carried out, each strategy of Player D induces a lottery over payoffs of $2, $1
and $0. For the analysis of Nash behavior, it is assumed that players’ preferences are
standard expected utility among (risky) lotteries. The expected payoffs are calculated
in the following way. Suppose that player E chooses (f1, f4) (i.e., bet-on-K ) and player
D decides for the uniform distribution b10. Given this strategy combination, Player E
gets $2 with a probability of 2
9
, which is the likelihood of drawing red in the first draw
times the probability of drawing black or yellow in the second draw, and $1 with a
probability of 5
9
, which is the probability of drawing red in the first and second draws
plus the probability of drawing not-red in both draws. Given the uniform distribution
of player D, player E’s expected payoff from playing (f1, f4) amounts to u(2)
2
9
+u(1)5
9
.
Given E’s strategy, player D loses in expectation u(−2)2
9
+ u(−1)5
9
by choosing the
uniform distribution. The expected utilities for player E’s strategies, given that player
D fills the urn with bn black balls, are
EU
[
(f1, f3) | bn
]
= u(2)30−bn
90
+ u(1)60−bn
90
,
EU
[
(f1, f4) | bn
]
= u(2)20
90
+ u(1)50
90
,
EU
[
(f2, f3) | bn
]
= u(2) bn(30−bn)
900
+ u(1) (bn)
2+(30−bn)2
900
,
EU
[
(f2, f4) | bn
]
= u(2)2bn
90
+ u(1)60−bn
90
,
(1)
8In the actual experiment, the payoffs are 0 EUR and 4 EUR instead of $0 and $1.
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where n = 0, . . . , 20.
Let us first assume that both players are risk neutral. In this case, the malev-
olent 3-color Ellsberg game is a zero-sum-game. Table 2 represents the expected
payoffs associated with each strategy combination. In the malevolent Ellsberg game,
Table 2: Expected payoffs in the malevolent 3-color Ellsberg game.
bet-on-Y bet-on-K bet-on-U bet-on-B
b20 −2030 , 2030 −1, 1 −1, 1 −4030 , 4030
...
...
...
...
...
b15 −2530 , 2530 −1, 1 −1, 1 −3530 , 3530
...
...
...
...
...
b10 −3030 , 3030 −1, 1 −1, 1 −3030 , 3030
...
...
...
...
...
b5 −3530 , 3530 −1, 1 −1, 1 −2530 , 2530
...
...
...
...
...
b0 −4030 , 4030 −1, 1 −1, 1 −2030 , 2030
there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: NE1 =
{
bet-on-K ; b10
}
and NE2 ={
bet-on-U ; b10
}
. In both equilibria, player D fills the Ellsberg urn with an equal
number of black and yellow balls. As a best response to this, player E’s chooses
bet-on-K in the first Nash equilibrium. That is, he bets on the events with known
probabilities. In the second equilibrium, player E bets on the events with unknown
probabilities and chooses the strategy bet-on-U. Both equilibria are payoff equivalent
for the players. Under the game-theoretic interpretation of the Ellsberg experiment
and risk neutrality, Nash behavior predicts bet-on-K and bet-on-U together with the
uniform composition of the urn.9
In the benevolent 3-color Ellsberg game, the payoffs of player D and E are perfectly
positively correlated. Both players win $1 whenever the color of a randomly drawn ball
9In the analysis, we concentrate on pure Nash equilibia. For sake of completeness, mixed behavior
is analyzed in Appendix 9.
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matches the chosen color(s) of player E and $0 when the colors do not match. Under
Table 3: Expected payoffs in the benevolent 3-color Ellsberg game.
bet-on-Y bet-on-K bet-on-U bet-on-B
b20
20
30
, 20
30
1, 1 1, 1 40
30
, 40
30
...
...
...
...
...
b15
25
30
, 25
30
1, 1 1, 1 35
30
, 35
30
...
...
...
...
...
b10
30
30
, 30
30
1, 1 1, 1 30
30
, 30
30
...
...
...
...
...
b5
35
30
, 35
30
1, 1 1, 1 25
30
, 25
30
...
...
...
...
...
b0
40
30
, 40
30
1, 1 1, 1 20
30
, 20
30
risk neutrality of both players, the expected payoffs in the benevolent Ellsberg game
are depicted in Table 3. Unlike the malevolent game, this is not a zero-sum game. The
set of Nash-Equilibria is larger in the benevolent game. Again, NE1 =
{
bet-on-K ; b10
}
and NE2 =
{
bet-on-U ; b10
}
constitute pure Nash equilibria. However, there are two
additional Nash equilibria in pure strategies: NE3 =
{
bet-on-Y ; b0
}
and NE4 ={
bet-on-B ; b20
}
. In the third Nash equilibrium, player E chooses bet-on-Y, while player
D fills the Ellsberg urn with 20 yellow balls. In the fourth Nash equilibrium, player E’s
strategy is bet-on-B and player D chooses the distribution containing 20 black balls.
The additional Nash equilibria predict coordination behavior. Both players coordinate
on one color and obtain the highest possible joint payoff.
It is also worth mentioning that the equilibrium behavior with coordination on the
black or yellow color strongly Pareto dominates the behavior in NE1 and NE2 where
player E chooses bet-on-K and bet-on-U, respectively. Furthermore, equilibria NE1
and NE2 are also risk dominated by the two pure coordination equilibria.
So far, the analysis has been conducted under the assumption of risk neutral play-
ers.10 Now, suppose that players’ utility functions are nonlinear. Note that the malev-
10In the risk neutral case, the pure Nash equilibria strategies used by player E correspond to
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olent game need not be zero-sum in utilities any longer. Table 4 represents player E’s
expected utilities for each strategy combination.
Table 4: Expected payoffs of player E - nonlinear utility function.
bet-on-Y bet-on-K bet-on-U bet-on-B
b20 u(2)
100
900
+u(1)400
900
u(2)200
900
+u(1)500
900
u(2)200
900
+u(1)500
900
u(2)400
900
+u(1)400
900
...
...
...
...
...
b15 u(2)
150
900
+u(1)450
900
u(2)200
900
+u(1)500
900
u(2)225
900
+u(1)450
900
u(2)300
900
+u(1)450
900
...
...
...
...
...
b10 u(2)
200
900
+u(1)500
900
u(2)200
900
+u(1)500
900
u(2)200
900
+u(1)500
900
u(2)200
900
+u(1)500
900
...
...
...
...
...
b5 u(2)
250
900
+u(1)550
900
u(2)200
900
+u(1)500
900
u(2)125
900
+u(1)650
900
u(2)100
900
+u(1)550
900
...
...
...
...
...
b0 u(2)
300
900
+u(1)600
900
u(2)200
900
+u(1)500
900
u(2) 0
900
+u(1)900
900
u(2) 0
900
+u(1)600
900
The best response structure of a risk averse or risk loving player E is identical to
the case of risk neutrality: Given b10, all strategies of E are a best response. In the
case of less black balls, the only best response is bet-on-Y. For more black balls, the
only best response is to play bet-on-B. This implies that the Nash equilibria are not
changed by the risk attitude of player E.
However, this is not the case for player D. A player D with a nonlinear util-
ity function has an incentive to deviate from the uniform distribution of balls given
that player E chooses bet-on-U. The deviation depends on the curvature of his util-
ity function and the treatment. In the benevolent treatment when player D’s utility
function is (strongly) concave, his best response to bet-on-U is to fill the Ellsberg urn
with no black balls and 20 yellow balls. However, when player D’s utility function is
his pure maxmin strategies. This is due to the game being zero-sum. The additional pure Nash
equilibria strategies that appear in the benevolent game correspond to his maxmax strategies. This
makes intuitive sense: when playing against an adversial player D in the malevolent game, the
cautious maxmin strategies are reasonable. In the benevolent game, where D’s payoff is maximized
by maximizing player E’s payoff, using maxmax is.
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Table 5: Pure Nash Equilibria - Malevolent Treatment.
Player E
RA RN RL
P
la
y
er
D RA NE1 NE1 NE1
RN NE1;NE2 NE1;NE2 NE1;NE2
RL NE1 NE1 NE1
(strongly) convex, the distribution containing 15 black and 5 yellow balls is his best
response to bet-on-U. In the malevolent treatment, the deviations are the opposite
of that. In either case, NE2 does not exist when player D is not risk neutral. The
strategy combination where player E decides to bet-on-K and player D chooses the
uniform distribution is the only pure Nash equilibrium in the malevolent game, NE1.
Table 6: Pure Nash Equilibria - Benevolent Treatment.
Player E
RA RN RL
P
la
y
er
D RA NE1;NE3;NE4 NE1;NE3;NE4 NE1;NE3;NE4
RN NE1;NE2;NE3;NE4 NE1;NE2;NE3;NE4 NE1;NE2;NE3;NE4
RL NE1;NE3;NE4 NE1;NE3;NE4 NE1;NE3;NE4
Summing up, when the Ellsberg task is conceived as an interactive situation, the
game-theoretic predictions are different for the malevolent and the benevolent variant
of the 3-color Ellsberg game. In the malevolent treatment (see Table 5), the concept of
pure Nash equilibrium predicts bet-on-K and, if the urn filler is risk neutral, bet-on-U.
However, bet-on-U is not predicted when the urn filler is risk averse or risk loving. In
the benevolent treatment (see Table 6), in addition to the Nash equilibria found in the
malevolent case, there exist pure coordination Nash equilibria. These are payoff and
risk dominant, and correspond to bet-on-Y and bet-on-B.
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Hypothesis 1. Pure Nash equilibria predictions:
a) In the malevolent treatment, subjects in the role of player E will bet-on-K or
bet-on-U.
b) In the benevolent treatment, subjects in the role of player E will bet-on-K, bet-
on-Y, bet-on-B or bet-on-U.
c) bet-on-Y and bet-on-B will be chosen more often in the benevolent treatment than
the malevolent treatment.
The idea to analyse the Ellsberg experiments as a game dates back to Schneeweiss
(1968, 1973). In those early papers, Schneeweiss already suggested that the Ellsberg
tasks can be analysed as a zero-sum game and calculated the maxmin solutions. For
the case of risk neutral subjects, the maxmin solutions are identical to the pure Nash
equilibrium strategies. However, the solution concepts differ for the case of risk aver-
sion and risk loving. Using maxmin, it is the Ellsberg decision maker’s risk attitude
that effects which strategy is chosen. Under the Nash equilibrium, it turns out that,
instead, it is the urn filler’s risk attitude that determines the decision maker’s equilib-
rium strategies. For the case of non-risk-neutrality, the Nash equilibrium is a better
solution concept than maxmin, since the game is no longer zero-sum in utilities.11 Dif-
ferent to our paper, Schneeweiss did not discuss the impact of Ellsberg’s experimental
conditions on actual experiments. Whether real subjects view the Ellsberg tasks as a
game, as an individual decision situation, or both, remains open.
3 Uncertainty Averse Preferences
Above, we derived the game-theoretic prediction for the Ellsberg 3-color experiment.
In this section, the decision-theoretic predictions are investigated.
There exist well established theories of decision-making under ambiguity, i.e., un-
certainty with unknown probabilities. Typically, the theories are formulated in the
setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Let S be a finite set of states and let ∆(X)
11This drawback of using maxmin is already mentioned by Schneeweiss (1973).
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be the set of all (simple) lotteries over a set consequences X.12 Objects of choice are
acts f : S → ∆(X); i.e., mappings from states to lotteries. Bets are binary acts. A
decision maker is characterized by a preference relation < on F , the set of all acts.
Among lotteries, but not necessarily among acts, preferences obey the axioms of ex-
pected utility theory. The decision-theoretic approach characterizes a functional V (·),
representing <, which specifies how some form of subjective beliefs on S and a utility
function u : X → R are aggregated when evaluating acts.
The canonical approach is the Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) theory of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989). In this theory, beliefs are represented by a non-empty, closed,
and convex set P of probability distributions on S with respect to which acts are
evaluated via the following functional:
V min(f) = min
p∈P
∫
S
u(f(s))dp({s}) ∀f ∈ F . (2)
Set P represents the probabilistic scenarios that the decision maker views as possible.
The min-operator encapsulates aversion towards ambiguity.13 When the min-operator
is replaced by its dual form, the max-operator, the decision maker exhibits proneness
towards ambiguity. If the subjective set of priors is a singleton, then the operators
min and max are irrelevant and the decision maker’s preferences are expected utility.
For a given set of priors P and an operator k ∈ {min,max}, we denote by V k the
k-functional representing a decision maker’s preference < on F .
Let us be more specific about how the functional V k rationalizes choices in the 3-
color experiment. In the MEU theory, the states of nature correspond to the outcome
of a random draw, the color of the ball. That is, S = {R,B, Y }. The bets of the
choice problems I and II (see Table 1) are depicted as mappings from S to degenerate
lotteries yielding $1 or $0, respectively. Consider a decision maker with a normalized
12The Anscombe-Aumann framework is a special case of the “purely subjective” setup of Savage
(1954) in which the set of consequences is an arbitrary set.
13The MEU model has been originally axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) in the setup of
Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Alternative axiomatizations, in the subjective setup of Savage (1954),
were provided by Casadesus-Masanell, Klibanoff, and Ozdenoren (2000a,b); Ghirardato, Maccheroni,
Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2003); and Alon and Schmeidler (2014).
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utility function, u($0) = 0 and u($1) = 1, and a set of probability distributions of the
following form:
P =
{
p ∈ ∆(S) : p({R}) = 1
3
, p({B}) ∈ [1
3
− ξ, 1
3
+ ξ]
}
, where ξ ∈ (0, 1
3
). (3)
The min-functional with respect to set P delivers the following evaluations:
V min(f1) =
1
3
>
1
3
− ξ = V min(f2),
V min(f4) =
2
3
>
1
3
+ ξ = V min(f3).
The MEU decision maker with set P decides to bet-on-K. That is, he chooses f1 in
problem I because its expected utility, which is the same for any prior in P , is higher
than the lowest expected utility associated with the alternative option f2. Following
the same line of reasoning, f4 is chosen in problem II. The crucial feature of the
MEU model is that the two choice problems are evaluated separately. Although there
is one urn, the decision maker believes that two distinct probability distributions are
possible, one in each problem:
p1 = (
1
3
,
1
3
− ξ, 1
3
+ ξ) and p2 = (
1
3
,
1
3
+ ξ,
1
3
− ξ).
In problem I, the expected utility of f2 is the smallest one under p1 and thus p1 is
the probability distribution rationalizing the decision maker’s preference for f1. Put
differently, he believes that p1 is the true distribution from which a random draw will
be taken to determine his payoff. For the same reason, the decision maker considers
p2 as the true distribution when comparing acts f3 and f4 in problem II. This is
exactly the manner in which the “malevolent Nature” enters into the model via the
min-operator: Nature is malevolent by always, “magically”, drawing a ball from such
a distribution that is the worst possible for this very part of the problem at which
the decision maker is currently looking. Under the max-operator, the logic works in
the opposite direction and Nature is perceived as benevolent. Given the max-operator
and set P , the decision maker behaves ambiguity loving and chooses f2 in problem I
and f3 in II. As mentioned before, if the subjective set P is a singleton, the min-
and max-operator play no role and the decision maker behaves ambiguity neutral. In
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particular, for a nonuniform prior, the decision maker chooses either f1 and f3 or f2
and f4 (i.e. bet-on-Y or bet-on-B). It is important to notice that the set of priors
P and the k-operator are characteristic of preferences reflecting the decision maker’s
perception of ambiguity and reaction to it, respectively (see Ghirardato, Maccheroni,
and Marinacci, 2004). Since subjects receive the same information about the Ellsberg
urn in both treatments, the decision-theoretic approach predicts no treatment effect.
That is, one expects to observe the same amount of subjects who bet-on-K, bet-on-U,
and bet-on-C in both treatments.
Hypothesis 2. Uncertainty averse preference predictions:
a) Consider a subject with preferences represented by V k with respect to a set P.
Depending on set P and the k-operator, the subject in the role of player E will
choose either bet-on-K, bet-on-U, or bet-on-C.
b) The behavior revealed by V k does only depend on the information about the
Ellsberg-urn, which is identical in the malevolent and benevolent treatments.
Therefore, the frequency of subjects who bet-on-K, bet-on-U and bet-on-C should
not change between treatments.
One could assume that for a given set of probabilities P , the k-operator is correlated
with the treatment, i.e., with the motives of the urn filler (player D). Since the
motives are explicitly stated in each treatment, it could be that subjects evaluate acts
according to V min in the malevolent treatment and according to V max in the benevolent
treatment. For ambiguity neutral subjects, whose sets of priors are singletons, themin-
and max- operators are irrelevant and this distinction does not matter. Therefore, the
same amount of subjects who bet-on-C will be observed in both treatments. However,
no bet-on-U should be observed in the malevolent treatment and no bet-on-K should
be observed in the benevolent treatment.
Hypothesis 2 is supported not only by MEU, but also by a broader class of ambigu-
ity models, the family of uncertainty averse preferences (UAP) introduced by Cerreia-
Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2011).14 Let ∆(S) be the set of all
14Another model supporting Hypothesis 2 is the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff, Marinacci,
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possible probability distributions over the state space S. The UAP are represented by
V UA(f) = min
p∈∆(S)
G
(∫
u(f)dp, p
)
∀f ∈ F , (4)
where G : R × ∆(S) → (−∞,∞] is a quasiconvex function, increasing in the first
variable, and satisfies infp∈∆(S) G(t, p) = t for all t. Function G is interpreted as an
ambiguity aversion index. Let c : ∆(S)→ [0,∞] be a convex (cost) function on ∆(S)
satisfying infp∈∆(S) c(p) = 0. When G(t, p) = t + c(p), V UA represents the variational
preferences axiomatized by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006). For a given
set of priors P , V UA with G(t, p) = t + c(p) represents MEU preferences whenever
c(p) = 0 for any p ∈ P and otherwise c(p) = ∞. The broad class of UAP unifies
all the generalizations of the MEU model that maintain the key axiom of Schmeidler
(1989), called Uncertainty Aversion. The axiom is the behavioral counterpart of an
averse attitude towards ambiguity. Roughly, it requires that a decision maker always
displays a weak preference for mixtures (randomizations) between two acts among
which the decision maker is indifferent.15
Besides satisfying Schmeidler’s axiom, the family of UAP is said to admit a “game
against Nature” interpretation. That is to say, an ambiguity averse decision maker is
interpreted as playing a hypothetical zero-sum game against a “malevolent Nature”.16
In this case, an act f and a probability distribution p become, respectively, the strate-
and Mukerji (2005). The model is built on the “two-stage approach” dating back to Segal (1987). A
decision maker has a subjective second order prior: that is, a prior over the possible compositions of
the Ellsberg urn. A concave (resp. convex) second order “utility function” (the so-called φ-function)
corresponds to ambiguity averse (resp. loving) behavior. The prediction of player E’s betting behavior
is driven by the curvature of his φ-function.
15In the Anscombe-Aumann setup, mixtures between acts are well defined; for each α ∈ [0, 1],
αf +(1−α)g is the act that delivers αf(s)+(1−α)g(s) in state s ∈ S. According to the Uncertainty
Aversion axiom, for any f, g ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1), if f ∼ g then αf + (1−α)g < g. Recently, Dominiak
and Schnedler (2011) provided an experimental evidence showing that ambiguity averse subjects
rather behave neutral towards mixtures, or even dislike randomization between two ambiguous acts.
16Based on the “game against Nature” interpretation, Ozdenoren and Peck (2008) use the notion
of subgame perfection to address the issue of dynamic consistency among ambiguity averse decision
makers in a dynamic version of the 3-color Ellsberg task. Similar to the UAP framework, they
keep the two questions separated and only consider responses to the second question as strategies.
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gies of the decision maker and of Nature (see Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci,
and Montrucchio, 2011). For instance, if the decision maker has MEU preferences and
contemplates choosing an act f , Nature responds by choosing a probability from a set
P so as to minimize the decision maker’s expected utility given his choice of act f (see
Equation 2).
Although both the “game against Nature” interpretation and the 3-color Ellsberg
game feature the aspect of playing against an opponent, there is a strong conceptual
difference. According to the “game against Nature” interpretation of UAP, when taken
literally, the Ellsberg task actually consists of two, separate, zero-sum games of the
subject versus Nature. One game for the first decision and a second game for the second
decision. In contrast, the 3-color Ellsberg game is a single game featuring all actions by
the decision maker as his strategy. As such, there is no separation of the two questions
asked during the Ellsberg task. Therefore, malevolence is captured very differently
in the game-theoretic setup. It is not modeled via the functional representing the
decision maker’s preferences, as in the UAP model, but, via the utility function of the
urn filler. The structural differences between the two approaches are explored in more
detail in the next section.
4 Comparing the Theories
What is the structural difference between the decision-theoretic models and the game-
theoretic one? Each model makes different assumptions about the characteristics
of the situation that the subjects are supposed to take into account when making
their decision. As a general rule, the UAP models restrict the subjects to consider
the outcome of a random draw from the urn as the only payoff-relevant source of
uncertainty. The decision is derived from the decision maker’s tastes over outcomes
in addition to some form of subjective beliefs. The form of the beliefs might differ
A real experiment on a dynamic version of the 3-color experiment was conducted by Dominiak,
Duersch, and Lefort (2012), finding that subjects behave in line with consequantialism rather than
dynamic consistency. One of these fundamental properties of dynamic behavior has to be relaxed
when modeling ambiguity aversion in dynamic setups (see Ghirardato, 2002; Siniscalchi, 2011).
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depending on the model, but is supposed to encompass the ambiguity perceived by
the decision maker (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2004). Not taken into
account are the motivations of the person filling the urn. The situation is not modeled
as a strategic (interactive) one.
In the game-theoretic model, it is assumed that both players are expected util-
ity maximizers. That is, the model strongly restricts the form of players’ preferences.
However, it additionally allows subjects to take into account a broader amount of infor-
mation about the situation they face. Instead of only looking at possible compositions
of the Ellsberg urn, subjects now consider as well the strategic implications of how
the urn was set up. As is shown in Section 2, even when using the most standard way
of modeling preferences, taking into account the strategic implications of the decision
situation leads to a prediction of bet-on-K or bet-on-U in the 3-color Ellsberg experi-
ment.17 Note that, since the Nash model does not possess free parameters, we arrive
at this prediction via a model that is more parsimonious compared to the ambiguity
models discussed in Section 3.
By far, the majority of Ellsberg urn experiments feature payoffs that correspond
to the malevolent game. That is, each amount of money paid to subjects is paid out
of the pockets of the person or institution which is also responsible for setting up the
composition of the urn. Subjects who take into account the monetary motivations of
the experimenters can legitimately consider the situation to be adversary.
The game-theoretical interpretation of the Ellsberg task delivers a prediction of
treatment differences in our experiment: more subjects E are predicted to choose
bet-on-C in the benevolent game compared to the malevolent game (see Table 7).
While ambiguity models can predict all choices, they need different parameter values
to predict different choices. Given that there is no within-model way of obtaining the
parameters from the situation faced by the decision maker, a reasonable assumption is
that the parameters are part of the preferences and as such stable across situations.18
17There are some recent papers that generalize the Nash equilibrium notion to ambiguity-sensitive
preferences: Dow and Werlang (1994), Lo (1996), Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), Marinacci (2000),
Bade (2011) and Lehrer (2012).
18One counter argument to this is that parameters could change from situation to situation. How-
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Table 7: Frequency Predictions of Behavior for Player E.
UAP Models Game Theory
Malevolent
Treatment
Benevolent
Treatment
Malevolent
Treatment
Benevolent
Treatment
# bet-on-K︸ ︷︷ ︸
“averse”
≥ # bet-on-K︸ ︷︷ ︸
“averse”
# bet-on-K︸ ︷︷ ︸
NE1 ≥
# bet-on-K︸ ︷︷ ︸
NE1
# bet-on-U︸ ︷︷ ︸
“loving”
≤ # bet-on-U︸ ︷︷ ︸
“loving”
# bet-on-U︸ ︷︷ ︸
NE2
# bet-on-U︸ ︷︷ ︸
NE2
# bet-on-C︸ ︷︷ ︸
“neutral”
= # bet-on-C︸ ︷︷ ︸
“neutral”
· · · ≤ # bet-on-C︸ ︷︷ ︸
NE3&NE4
UAP: The number of subjects who bet-on-C is equal across treatments. The fraction of subjects
who bet-on-K (bet-on-U) is larger (smaller) or equal in malevolent than in benevolent.
GT: The number of subjects who bet-on-C is higher in Benevolent. (Note: Nash equilibrium NE2
only exists if player D is risk-neutral.)
Given the same set of parameters for beliefs, the ambiguity models would not predict a
difference in the number of subjects who bet-on-C, bet-on-K and bet-on-U between the
malevolent and benevolent treatments. Additionally, if one allows the min-operator
to change into a max-operator, the MEU model would predict a difference between
treatments, but only in the number of subjects who bet-on-K and bet-on-Y. That is, no
bet-on-Y in the malevolent treatment and no bet-on-K in the benevolent treatment.
We conduct an experiment to empirically test the different predictions made with
actual behavior by subjects in the malevolent and benevolent case.
ever, note that a model which can predict each possible outcome (given some parameters), and does
not tie down parameters, essentially has no predictive power.
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5 Experiment
5.1 Experimental Design
The experimental design includes three treatments - (B)enevolent, (M)alevolent and
(S)tandard - which all employ the 3-color Ellsberg urn to elicit subjects’ behavior in
the face of an ambiguous situation.
In treatments B and M, the Ellsberg decisions are made by subjects of type E,
while the urns are filled by subjects of type D. Both treatments are identical up to
the monetary incentives of subjects D. At the start of the experiment, each subject
is randomly assigned role D or role E, and Ds and Es are anonymously matched into
pairs. Each subject D is separately tasked with determining the distribution of a 3-
color Ellsberg urn. To this end, all Ds receive a nontransparent urn already filled with
10 red balls. Additionally, they receive 20 black and 20 yellow balls. Out of these,
they are asked to choose 20 balls, in any combination, to add to the 10 red balls. The
thus constructed 3-color urns are taken by the experimenter and placed on a table in
sight of all subjects.19
Subjects of type E are asked to make the usual 3-color Ellsberg choices. That is,
each E is asked to make a decision on the following two choices, each refering to a
separate draw (with replacement), conducted later, out of the Ellsberg urn constructed
by the matched D:
• First choice: Do you prefer to
– receive a payment of 4 EUR if the drawn ball is red, or
– receive a payment of 4 EUR if the drawn ball is black?
• Second choice: Do you prefer to
– receive a payment of 4 EUR if the drawn ball is red or yellow, or
– receive a payment of 4 EUR if the drawn ball is black or yellow?
19The remaining balls are used by the experimenter to fact check that all urns contain the correct
number of balls.
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Note that we use the standard framing of the Ellsberg task, where two questions are
asked separately, instead of a possible different framing where strategies are elicited via
a single question. As such, our design is conservative when testing whether subjects
view the two questions as one integrated task. Subjects E are also asked to indicate
their confidence in their own decisions on a five point Likert scale.20
In treatment B, the incentives of E and D are perfectly aligned: whatever E wins
in the Ellsberg task will be paid to D as well. In treatment M, this is reversed.
D is paid a lump sum of 12 EUR, and all earnings by E are deducted from this.21
Thus, treatments B and M implement the benevolent and malevolent Ellsberg game
discussed in Section 2.
Treatment S corresponds to the standard Ellsberg procedures. All subjects are of
type E and the urn was filled by the experimenter. The instructions gave no specific
procedure indicating how the urn was filled.
All subjects answered a questionnaire at the end of the experiment. As part of
the unpaid questionnaire, subjects were asked for a point estimate of the number of
black and yellow balls in the urn if they were of type E. Both E and D had to answer
how they would have, hypothetically, chosen if placed in the other role. Finally, the
questionnaire included a 10 item optimism/pessimism scale.22
5.2 Procedures
The experiment consisted of eleven sessions and was conducted at the laboratory
of University of Heidelberg from June 2010 to March 2011 and in May 2013. All
recruitment was done via ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). In total, 169 subjects took part
in our experiment, 88 male and 81 female.23
20See http://www.adominiak.com/InstructionsDominiakDuersch.zip for all instruction material.
21If both E and D choose randomly, the expected earnings in both treatments are 8 EUR for all
subjects.
22German version of the Life-Orientation-Test, LOT-R (Glaesmer, Hoyer, Klotsche, and Herzberg,
2008).
23One subject D has been excluded from the dataset, since he had participated in two sessions.
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While entering the lab, subjects randomly picked a table tennis ball labeled with
their seat number and a letter. In treatments B and M, the letter was used to match
subjects D and E, who were seated at opposite walls of the lab. No communication
was allowed, and we did not observe any instances of attempted communication by
subjects. The matching rule was explained in neutral wording by the experimenter
before the instructions were handed out. Subjects were told that everyone received the
same instructions. Questions were answered in private by the experimenter. After Ds
had filled their urns and Es marked their decisions on the decision sheet, the sheets
and urns were collected by the experimenter.24
The draws from each urn were done by the experimenter in public in the middle
of the room. Afterwards, the experimenter calculated the earnings of each subject in
private, while subjects answered the questionnaire. Finally, all subjects were called
according to their seat number and paid their earnings in private and in cash. Subjects
earned on average 7.50 EUR for roughly 45 minutes in the lab.
In treatment S, no subjects of type D took part. All participants were of type E.
A single urn was used and placed in sight of the subjects for the entire experiment.
5.3 Results
We start by describing the behavior of the 104 subjects E, our main group of interest.
Averaged over all treatments, 8.7% of subjects bet-on-U, 44.2% bet-on-K and 47.1%
bet-on-C.25 However, as depicted in Figure 1, this varies across treatments: while in
treatment B 22.6% of subjects E bet-on-K, this jumps to 48.5% in treatment M and
57.5% in treatment S. Using the Fisher exact test, the differences between B and
M (two-sided, p=.039, obs=64) and between B and S (two-sided, p=.004, obs=71)
are significant. However, M and S are not significantly different (two-sided, p=.486,
obs=74). This result is mirrored when looking at subjects who bet-on-C. Treatments
24Urns were collected first to ensure that Es could make their decision after the composition of
the urn was determined. Both urns and decision sheets were labeled with the same letter as the
respective table tennis ball.
25Out of the subjects who bet-on-C , 53.1% favored black and 46.9% favored yellow.
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B and M are significantly different (two-sided, p=.047, obs=64) and so are B and S
(two-sided, p=.001, obs=71), while M and S are not (two-sided, p=.225, obs=74).
The share of subjects who bet-on-U is never significantly different between any two
treatments.
Result 1a: More subjects choose bet-on-K and fewer subjects bet-on-C in the
malevolent treatment compared to the benevolent treatment.
Result 1b: In all treatments, bet-on-U is chosen least often.
Concerning the across treatment predictions, we thus find evidence in favor of the
Nash prediction (Hypothesis 1c), while the results are not compatible with the UAP
prediction (Hypothesis 2b). Regarding within treatment predictions, the UAP theo-
ries can explain every possible betting behavior. Hypothesis 2a is therefore trivially
satisfied in all treatments. Pure Nash equilibrium Hypothesis 1b for treatment B is
similar. In the case of risk neutral players D, every betting behavior can be explained
as a pure Nash equilibrium strategy. If players D are not risk neutral, bet-on-U is
not predicted. In the experiment, there are indeed very few subjects who bet-on-U.
Hypothesis 1a for treatment M is not confirmed, since there exist players E in M who
bet-on-C.
We can draw additional conclusions. Notice that there are no significant differ-
ences between the malevolent treatment M and the standard implementation of the
3-color Ellsberg task in treatment S.26 This suggests that subjects perceive the stan-
dard implementation as a game against the experimenter and view the experimenter
as an opponent rather than as an ally. In most Ellsberg experiments, the filling of the
urn, and the monetary consequences for subjects and experimenters are set up similar
26The Ellsberg paradox has been studied in a large literature in psychology as well. Here, the
most common implementation of the Ellsberg experiment is not incentiviced. Subjects are asked to
imagine a particular situation and report their imagined behavior. Using such a hypothetical 2-color
Ellsberg urn, Ku¨hberger and Perner (2003) study the effect of playing against or with an urn filler.
Their data is broadly in line with our game theoretic analysis presented in Appendix 7 & 8.
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Figure 1: Betting behavior by treatment
to our treatment S. That is, a large part of the experimental literature looks only at
one extreme case of implementing the Ellsberg task, namely subjects reacting to a
malevolent urn filler. The other extreme, reacting to a benevolent urn filler, has been
ignored so far.27
Result 2: Betting behavior in the standard treatment is not significantly different
from the malevolent treatment, but significantly different from the benevolent treat-
ment.
Table 8 shows a multinomial probit regression controlling for being female, partici-
pation in a formal course in game theory or statistics, optimism, whether the subjects
play games of chance; and the subjects’ self-reported confidence in their choices. The
regression compares subjects who bet-on-C and bet-on-U to the base outcome, bet-on-
K. Result 1 is confirmed. Subjects in the benevolent treatment choose significantly
27See Camerer and Weber (1992) and Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2014) for a review of ambiguity
experiments.
more often bet-on-C rather than bet-on-K. This is not true in the malevolent treat-
ment, where the difference is insignificant. Gender or playing games of chance do not
have a significant impact; neither does being more optimistic on the psychological op-
timism scale we elicit in the questionnaire nor having participated in a formal course
in game theory or statistics. However, subjects who choose bet-on-K have a higher
average confidence in their choices.28
Figure 2: Histogram of black balls used by subjects D.
Up till now, we evaluated subjects E, who choose more bet-on-C in treatment B.
That is, they tried to coordinate on one color. Now, we look at subjects D. Do these,
as well, try to coordinate? As Figure 2 shows, they do. The number of subjects D
playing a pure coordination strategy (no black balls at all, or only black balls, corre-
sponding to their strategy in NE3 and NE4) is significantly higher in the benevolent
treatment (Fisher exact test, two-sided, p=0.023, obs=25). That is, both players try
28Overall, our subjects are reasonably confident in their choices. On average, they report a confi-
dence of 2.45 and 2.95 (out of {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}) for the first and the second task. Only 6, respectively 3,
subjects reported having a confidence of zero. All of our results are unchanged if we exclude subjects
with zero confidence from the analysis.
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Table 8: Multinomial Probit on Betting Behavior
Multinomial Probit Regression Number of obs = 104
Wald χ2(14) = 25.33
Prob > χ2 = 0.0314Log Likelihood = -82.075347
Betting Behavior Coef. Std. Err. z P >| z | 95% Conf. Inter.
bet-on-U
Treatment M -0.5473915 0.7228561 -0.76 0.449 -1.964163 0.869380
Treatment B -0.0259499 0.6992147 -0.04 0.970 -1.396386 1.344486
Optimism 0.0842592 0.0553064 1.52 0.128 -0.024139 0.192658
AVGconfidence -0.7010100 0.3283717 -2.13 0.033 -1.344607 -0.057414
Female 0.3138005 0.5968215 0.53 0.599 -0.855948 1.483549
Formal Course -0.6276003 0.6304215 -1.00 0.319 -1.863204 0.608003
Games of Chance -0.1157415 0.7190218 -0.16 0.872 -1.524998 1.293515
Cons 0.8256525 0.8953712 0.92 0.356 -0.929243 2.580548
bet-on-C
Treatment M 0.3940401 0.4846323 0.81 0.416 -0.555822 1.343902
Treatment B 1.4532870 0.4908000 2.96 0.003 0.491336 2.415237
Optimism 0.0055134 0.0347493 0.16 0.874 -0.062594 0.073621
AVGconfidence -0.4681461 0.2309238 -2.03 0.043 -0.920748 -0.015544
Female -0.1847030 0.4052473 -0.46 0.649 -0.978973 0.609567
Formal Course 0.4485750 0.4078894 1.10 0.271 -0.350874 1.248024
Games of Chance 0.4201125 0.4603592 0.91 0.361 -0.482175 1.322400
Cons 0.5086800 0.7273153 0.70 0.484 -0.916832 1.934192
bet-on-K (base outcome)
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to achieve the higher coordination payoff in treatment B, but shy away from this po-
tentially exploitable strategy when in a zero-sum payoff game in treatment M. This
is in line with the pure Nash equilibrium prediction.
Result 3: Subjects D attempt to coordinate more in treatment B than in treat-
ment M.
A last question concerns the success of coordination. Did subjects manage to coor-
dinate on one color? The results show that they did not. While both groups of subjects
tried to coordinate, they failed to pick one color on which to coordinate. 62.5% of sub-
jects E who attempted to coordinate did so on the strategy favoring black; but out of
the coordinating D, only 52.9% used black balls. Therefore subjects reap only a very
small advantage from their coordination attempts.29
Result 4: Coordination on one color is attempted, but fails.
6 Concluding Remarks
Experimental implementations of Ellsberg’s thought-experiments have traditionally
been used as evidence against SEU and in favor of axiomatic models of ambiguity-
sensitive preferences. We design an experiment showing that, rather than displaying
ambiguity-sensitive preferences in individual choice problems, subjects in real Ellsberg
experiments are better described as playing a game against the person who determined
the distribution of balls in the urn. In two treatments, which keep all information about
the Ellsberg urn unchanged - while varying the incentives of the urn filler - we find a
treatment difference as predicted by the pure Nash equilibrium, but not predicted by
the MEU model or its extensions.
While our work is concerned with the conclusions typically drawn from real Ells-
berg experiments, Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009a,b) challenged the existing ambiguity
29Due to unlucky matching and draws, subjects in treatment B achieved an average payoff even
slightly less than the expected one for completely random choice on both sides.
29
models by questioning the rationality of ambiguity averse behavior.30 They also crit-
icized the significance of the models as a descriptive approach. As a main argument,
Al-Najjar and Weinstein argued that the Ellsberg-type behavior can be consistently
explained by heuristics learned by subjects in the real-word context but misapplied
in the laboratory environment: “the basic experimental findings supporting Ellsberg
choices cannot distinguish between two competing explanations: 1. Ambiguity models
which explain these choices by appealing to taste (ambiguity aversion). 2. A model
where subjects misapply heuristics that serve them well in real-world situations.” (Al-
Najjar and Weinstein, 2009a, p. 277)
This paper demonstrates that there is no need to appeal to heuristics. Solving
the Ellsberg task as one game, using standard expected utility preferences, delivers
predictions that explain the observed behavior. Moreover, creating an actual game
with two subjects as players allows for an experimental test of the two competing
theories: game theory versus ambiguity models. Using a real experiment, we are not
restricted to argue our point from the practicality and reasonableness of the theories
alone. The experimental results show different behavior under different incentives of
the opponent, contrary to the predictions of the UAP models. On the other hand,
subject behavior matches what we would expect from game theory. This provides
evidence that subjects interpret the Ellsberg task as a game against the filler of the
urn and not as isolated individual decision tasks, as implied by the conditions placed
by Ellsberg on his thought-experiments.
One caveat is in order. In the malevolent treatment, 45.5% of the subjects bet-
on-C, even though this is not a pure Nash equilibrium. While bet-on-C can be part
of mixed Nash equilibria, it seems implausible to us that such a high proportion of
subjects would use mixed Nash equilibria. It is likely that not all subjects analyse the
situation as a game and integrate their choices into one decision. A part of the subjects
may indeed ignore the interaction with the urn filler, as assumed by Ellsberg and the
30As an argument against the rationality of the ambiguity models, Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009a)
scrutinize some behavioral anomalies displayed by ambiguity averse subjects facing a dynamic decision
problem; e.g., the sunk cost fallacy or aversion towards new information. For counterarguments and
further discussion on the topic, see Mukerji (2009); Siniscalchi (2009).
30
ambiguity literature. However, note that this cannot be interpreted as evidence for
theories of ambiguity aversion. The observations which cannot be explained by pure
Nash equilibria strategies are those who bet-on-C. That is, if these unexplained subjects
treat the situation as a one-person decision problem, then they act ambiguity neutral.
What is the consequence of our findings? Up until now, the Ellsberg experiment
results have typically been interpreted as strong evidence against the standard SEU
theory, and were, therefore, the empirical underpinning of a large amount of literature
on preference-based theories which were developed to resolve the Ellsberg paradox. It
has been shown that Ellsberg’s results are not paradoxical when the task is viewed
as a game by the subjects. As such, SEU cannot be rejected unless all the Ellsberg
conditions are satisfied. There is a new need to develop experimental tests of SEU
that take Ellsberg’s conditions into account, if possible at all.
7 Appendix: The 2-color Experiment
In the 2-color version of Ellsberg’s thought-experiment, 2 urns are used. A known urn
(K) containing 50 red and 50 black balls, and an unknown urn (U), containing 100
balls in total, with an unknown number of red or black balls. Subjects are asked, for
each color, whether they want to have a draw (to win a prize) from the known or the
unknown urn. Call rK a bet on drawing from the known urn, paying $1 if the draw is
red and $0 otherwise. Bets rU , bK , bU are defined equivalently. Then, the strategy set
of player E is SE = {(rK , bK); (rK , bU); (rU , bK); (rU , bU)}. The strategy set of player
D is SD = {b0, . . . , b100}. Suppose first that both players are risk neutral. Table 9
represents the players’ expected payoffs in the malevolent 2-color Ellsberg game. The
two pure Nash equilibria are: NE1 = {b50; (rK , bK)} and NE2 = {b50; (rU , bU)}. That
is, choosing bet-on-K or bet-on-U by player E is a pure Nash equilibrium. In either
case, the run filler uses exactly 50 balls of each color.
Next, suppose that player E has a nonlinear utility function. The corresponding
expected payoffs are summarized in Table 10. If player D is risk neutral, the Nash
equilibria remain unchanged. However, if player D is risk averse with a (strongly)
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Table 9: Expected payoffs in the malevolent 2-color Ellsberg game.
(rK, bK) (rK , bU) (rU , bK) (rU , bU)
b100 −1, 1 −32 , 32 −12 , 12 −1, 1
...
...
...
...
...
b50 −1,1 −1, 1 −1, 1 −1,1
...
...
...
...
...
b0 −1, 1 −12 , 12 −32 , 32 −1, 1
concave utility function then the only Nash equilibrium is NE1 = {b50; (rK , bK)}.
Table 10: Expected payoffs of player E in the 2-color Ellsberg game - nonlinear utility.
(rK , bK) (rK , bU) (rU , bK) (rU , bU)
b100 u(2)
1
4
+u(1)1
2
u(2)1
2
+u(1)1
2
u(1)1
2
u(1)
...
...
...
...
...
b50 u(2)
1
4
+u(1)1
2
u(2)1
4
+u(1)1
2
u(2)1
4
+u(1)1
2
u(2)1
4
+u(1)1
2
...
...
...
...
...
b0 u(2)
1
4
+u(1)1
2
u(1)1
2
u(2)1
2
+u(1)1
2
u(1)
In a benevolent version of the 2-color Ellsberg game (not depicted here), additional
pure Nash equilibria arise where the urn filler uses only one color, on which the decision
maker bets. The two coordination Nash equilibria of the benevolent game are not
affected by the players’ risk attitudes.
Summing up, the predictions for the 2-color Ellsberg game mirror the predictions
derived in Section 2 for the 3-color Ellsberg game. In the malevolent game, the pure
Nash equilibria strategies correspond to betting on the known probability colors or to
betting on the unknown probability colors. When the urn filler has a nonlinear utility
function, only betting on the known probability colors survives. In the benevolent
game, additional coordination equilibria arise.
Sometimes, the 2-color Ellsberg experiment is conducted with only one question.
In this shorter version, subjects are asked to bet on one color, not the other. Then
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betting on the known probability color and a uniform distribution of balls constitute
the only pure Nash equilibrium.
8 Appendix: Suspicion
Regarding the 2-color Ellsberg experiment, the following line of reasoning is used
against fixing the colors of the bets. The experimenter fills the urn. Subjects are
suspicious of the experimenter and therefore do not bet on the (fixed) color in the
unknown urn. They reason that the experimenter would not put the color in the urn
that subjects can bet on. As a precaution against this suspicion, subjects are not only
allowed to choose whether to bet on the risky or the unknown urn, but allowed to
choose which color to bet on, as well.
How would the pure Nash equilibria of the 3-color Ellsberg game be impacted
if subjects, additionally to choosing the bets, could also choose whether to bet on
the unknown probability event suggested by the experimenter - black in problem
I and non black in problem II - or to reverse the payoffs on the unknown colors
and bet on the unknown color not originally suggested by the experimenter (i.e.,
yellow in problem I and non yellow in problem II)? Call the former option Keep
and the latter Switch. Consequently, the strategy set of player E enlarges to SE =
{(fK1 , fK3 ); (fK1 , fK4 ); (fK2 , fK3 ); (fK2 , fK4 ); (fS1 , fS3 ); (fS1 , fS4 ); (fS2 , fS3 ); (fS2 , fS4 )}. For in-
stance, a player choosing (fS2 , f
S
3 ) bets on an unknown probability event, but not on
black in problem I and non black in problem II, as initially offered. Instead, the
player switches and bets on yellow in problem I and non yellow in problem II.
Table 11 represents players’ expected payoffs in the extended (malevolent) 3-color
Ellsberg game, under the assumption of risk neutrality. The original pure Nash equi-
libria persist for the Keep-strategies. For the Switch-strategies, two mirrored Nash
equilibria appear. As before, player E either chooses bet-on-K or bet-on-U, but does
not bet-on-C. If the urn filler has a nonlinear utility function, only the Nash equilibria
where player E bets on the known probability events are left (here Keep or Switch
are irrelevant, since switching only alters the payoffs when subjects bet on an unkown
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Table 11: Expected payoffs in malevolent 3-color Ellsberg game with switching.
(fK1 , f
K
3 ) (f
K
1 , f
K
4 )(f
K
2 , f
K
3 )(f
K
2 , f
K
4 ) (f
S
1 , f
S
3 ) (f
S
1 , f
S
4 ) (f
S
2 , f
S
3 ) (f
S
2 , f
S
4 )
b20 −2030 , 2030 −1, 1 −1, 1 −4030 , 4030 −4030 , 4030 −1, 1 −1, 1 −2030 , 2030
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
b15 −2530 , 2530 −1, 1 −1, 1 −3530 , 3530 −3530 , 3530 −1, 1 −1, 1 −2530 , 2530
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
b10 −3030 , 3030 −1, 1 −1, 1 −3030 , 3030 −3030 , 3030 −1, 1 −1, 1 −3030 , 3030
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
b5 −3530 , 3530 −1, 1 −1, 1 −2530 , 2530 −2530 , 2530 −1, 1 −1, 1 −3530 , 3530
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
b0 −4030 , 4030 −1, 1 −1, 1 −2030 , 2030 −2030 , 2030 −1, 1 −1, 1 −4030 , 4030
event). As such, the predictions with respect to betting behavior are unchanged. The
same holds true for the benevolent case.
Note that this is not surprising. As shown in Table 2, there is no way the ex-
perimenter can stack the urn in his favor in the 3-color urn. Therefore the suspicion
argument has no bite in the 3-color Ellsberg game.
9 Appendix: Mixed Nash Equilibria
There are infinitely many Nash equilibria in mixed (non-pure) strategies. Denote by
∆(SE) the set of all probability distributions on the set SE. For any α = (α1,3, α1,4, α2,3, α2,4)
in ∆(SE), αk,l denotes the probability that player E ’s choices are (fk, fl) with k ∈
{1, 2} and l ∈ {3, 4}. Denote by ∆(SD) the set of all probability distributions on the
set SD. For any β = (β0, . . . , βn, . . . , β20) in ∆(SD), βn is the probability that player D
chooses a composition of the urn consisting of bn black balls with n = 0, . . . , 20. A pair
of probability distributions (α∗, β∗) constitute a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
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for risk neutral players whenever they satisfy the following condition:
α∗ ∈ ∆(SE) such that α1,3 = α2,4 and α1,4 = α2,3,
β∗ ∈ ∆(SD) such that
∑20
n=0 βn(
20+bn
30
) = 1.
(5)
The set of mixed equilbria is identical in the malevolent and the benevolent game.
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